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Financial policy, coalition and Sir Kingsley Wood, 1940-41* 
 
Abstract 
There has recently been renewed interest in British politics during the Second World War. 
Meanwhile the financial strategy pursued by the Churchill government – widely considered 
an important step towards ‘Keynesian’ measures – has long received extensive attention from 
scholars. This article makes a fresh contribution to the literature, exploring the process 
through which the political legitimacy of that strategy was established and communicated in 
the first year of the coalition. It places particular emphasis upon the role of Sir Kingsley 
Wood, Chancellor of the Exchequer, in integrating the coalition government. He gradually 
constructed support for the policy and worked to avoid destabilising rows over finance 
between the major parties. The article concentrates on the crucial period during 1940 and 
1941 when policies were being simultaneously formulated and explained. It seeks to give a 
sense of how Wood’s policies were justified – particularly the methods and language 
employed to sell them – in the context of coalition. 
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When Winston Churchill became prime minister in May 1940, he appointed Sir Kingsley 
Wood, a veteran Conservative MP and senior party figure, as the new Chancellor of the 
Exchequer.1 Remaining at the Treasury until his death in late 1943, Wood was charged with 
the formidable task of financing the British war effort. And he had to do so at a time when the 
Treasury was demoted from its position as the leading department of state. There followed 
more than a year of study and argument. Wood’s eventual strategy – expressed in the 1941 
Budget – moved Britain down the road towards Keynesian economics. His method of paying 
for the war was innovative. But, politically, the task of settling on a policy and then 
constructing support for it was a significant challenge; over the course of 1940 and 1941, 
financial policy threatened to destabilise the coalition between the Conservative and Labour 
parties. While the story of Britain’s slow and partial turn towards Keynesianism has been 
explored before, this article analyses the gradual process through which the political 
legitimacy of the measures necessary to finance the war was established. 
In seeking to draw out this important aspect of public life during the early stages of 
the conflict, the paper builds upon the existing literature examining wartime Westminster.2 In 
recent years there has been a renewed emphasis among scholars on the politics of war. Some 
innovative work within this body of literature has revised established ideas about political 
communication with the wider public.3 There have been reassessments of party politics: the 
grass-roots have been the subject of exhaustive investigation by Andrew Thorpe, while the 
importance of Clement Attlee in holding the coalition together and advancing Labour’s 
                                                            
* I am grateful to Paul Addison, Martin Chick, Henry Irving, Gordon Pentland and Richard Whiting, as well as 
the editors and four anonymous referees, for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of the article. 
1 There is no published biography of Wood. But consult the perceptive essay by G.C. Peden, ‘Kingsley Wood’, 
in Lawrence Goldman, Brian Harrison, and Colin Matthews (eds.), The Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography (Oxford, 2004, online edn.), and Roy Jenkins, The Chancellors (London, 1998), chapter seventeen. 
2 Paul Addison, The Road to 1945: British Politics and the Second World War (London, 1975) and Kevin 
Jefferys, The Churchill Coalition and Wartime Politics, 1940-1945 (Manchester, 1991) provide powerful 
overviews. 
3 Laura Beers, Your Britain: Media and the Making of the Labour Party (London, 2010), chapter nine, and 
Richard Toye, The Roar of the Lion: The Untold Story of Churchill’s World War II Speeches (Oxford, 2013). 
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interests has been highlighted.4 David Edgerton has offered a fresh perspective on the British 
state itself, building on his challenge to ‘declinist’ literature and stressing the power and 
wealth that drove the war effort.5 Though there is no single historiographical agenda here, 
this wave of new work betokens a reappraisal of a crucial period of transition.  
What follows is an attempt to recall a neglected moment when policies were being 
simultaneously developed and explained. The article explores the year-long process through 
which a financial strategy was devised and articulated over 1940 and 1941. It highlights a 
close connection between action and utterance. While historians have noted Wood’s status as 
a leading Conservative he has remained elusive, with little attention paid to his significance 
as Chancellor. In fact he was intimately involved in managing a cross-party negotiation over 
the distribution of scarce resources at a time of crisis. In foregrounding Wood’s activity, this 
article demonstrates his contribution to the process of integration and stabilisation under the 
Churchill regime. It shows how considerations of coalition, the give-and-take of alliance, 
impacted upon financial policy. This also raises broader questions about the creative role 
played by Conservative politicians in domestic politics after 1940. Simon Ball reached 
similar conclusions from Oliver Lyttelton’s stint as President of the Board of Trade, an 
architect of the state’s apparatus of rationing and controls.6 The article complements this. 
Within the older historiography of wartime politics, relatively little attention was paid to 
Conservatives as a creative domestic force – probably because of the ascendancy of 
Churchill’s cabal and the marginalisation of the rest of the party. Kevin Jefferys offered one 
                                                            
4 For instance, Robert Crowcroft, Attlee’s War: World War II and the Making of a Labour Leader (London, 
2011), and Andrew Thorpe, Parties at War: Political Organization in Second World War Britain (Oxford, 
2009) and, by the same author, ‘Locking out the communists: The Labour party and the Communist party, 1939-
46’, Twentieth Century British History (forthcoming, 2014). See also Peter Sloman, 'Rethinking a progressive 
moment: the Liberal and Labour parties in the 1945 general election', Historical Research (2010), 722-44. 
5 David Edgerton, Britain’s War Machine: Weapons, Resources and Experts in the Second World War (London, 
2011). 
6 See Simon Ball, The Guardsmen (London, 2004), chapter six. 
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of the few exceptions, highlighting the role of the party in domestic debates.7 Yet Jefferys’s 
paper did not emphasise the importance of Wood and finance. Meanwhile, Paul Addison 
examined the Conservative struggle to remain relevant, but largely focused on the final stages 
of the conflict.8 
Grappling with the political presentation of complex, nuanced economic problems, 
Wood played a significant part in the early stages of the coalition. The tax historian Basil 
Sabine observed that ‘There have been biographies of World War II figures whose 
importance … rank far below’ that of Wood.9 The article’s principal area of focus is the 
politics of Whitehall. The justification for this is that Wood seems to have carefully gauged 
his measures specifically in relation to the atmosphere at Westminster. The development of 
strategy within Whitehall was consistently (and often explicitly) linked to its articulation and 
reception within parliamentary politics. But the article also seeks to highlight the reception of 
significant financial policies among the wider public in order to contrast the two realms of 
activity. 
In addition, it adds to a second body of literature, that on economic policy. A number 
of scholars have probed Britain’s journey towards Keynesianism from the 1920s.10 This 
article complements these works, assessing how policy was refined and ‘sold’ at the moment 
of implementation. Although the Treasury lost its pre-eminence under Churchill as the state 
gave priority to mobilising ‘physical’ resources, this has sometimes deflected understanding 
                                                            
7 Kevin Jefferys, ‘British Politics and Social Policy during the Second World War’, Historical Journal (1987), 
123-44. See also Hartmut Kopsch, ‘The approach of the Conservative party to social policy during World War 
II’, unpublished University of London Ph.D thesis (1970). 
8 Addison, The Road to 1945, chapter nine. 
9 Basil Sabine, ‘The Finance Act 1941’, British Tax Review (1984), 185-90, at 190. 
10 Stephen Brooke, ‘Fundamentalists and revisionists: the Labour party and economic policy during the Second 
World War’, Historical Journal (1989), 157-75; Peter Clarke, The Keynesian Revolution in the Making, 1924-
1936 (Oxford, 1990); Daniel Ritschel, The Politics of Planning: The Debate on Economic Planning in Britain in 
the 1930s (Oxford, 1997). 
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of what the department did do during the war.11 The comprehensive official history by R.S. 
Sayers, published in 1956, remains an excellent guide to the details of policy.12 G.C. Peden 
drew out the implications of the domestic and international policies settled on in Whitehall. 
Other aspects of economic management have received extensive attention.13 
The article seeks to deepen our understanding by properly situating some of these 
departures in financial policy within the maelstrom of wartime Westminster. What is missing 
from the historiography is a clear sense of how these policies were justified, and the language 
that was used to explain them, in the context of coalition. This was important in establishing 
the stability of the cross-party government. The article examines Wood’s presentation of a 
range of issues, from profiteering and wages to Budgetary policy, identifying common 
themes and methods. This approach shaped the 1941 Budget. The sensitivities of the Labour 
party were particularly important. In addressing this, the article makes linkages between the 
work of economic and political historians. Other scholars have recently taken a not-dissimilar 
approach.14  
This period has long been marked by a debate about the supposed-forging of a 1940s 
‘consensus’ on major issues of policy.15 What is now clear is that politicians continued to 
disagree, and the evidence for ‘consensus’ is largely dependent on which area of policy one 
                                                            
11 G.C. Peden, The Treasury and Public Policy (Cambridge, 2000), chapter seven, addresses this. 
12 R.S. Sayers, History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Civil Series – Financial Policy, 1939-1945 
(London, 1956). Consult too W.K. Hancock and M.M. Gowing, History of the Second World War: United 
Kingdom Civil Series – British War Economy (London, 1949). 
13 For a flavour of the other literature, see Corelli Barnett, The Audit of War (London, 1986); Alec Cairncross, 
‘Economists in wartime’, Contemporary European History (1994), 19-36; D.N. Chester, Lessons of the British 
War Economy (London, 1951); G.C. Peden, Arms, Economics and British Strategy (Cambridge, 2007), chapter 
four. 
14 Studying John Maynard Keynes’s efforts to build bridges with Labour during the ‘phoney war’, Richard Toye 
has demonstrated that the political packaging of economic ideas was frequently as important as their content: 
see Richard Toye, ‘The Labour party and Keynes’, in E.H.H. Green and D.M. Tanner (eds.), The Strange 
Survival of Liberal England (Cambridge, 2011), 153-85, at 168. Jim Tomlinson, on Margaret Thatcher, 
explicitly stressed the merits of examining the politics of financial policy. Consult Jim Tomlinson, ‘Thatcher, 
monetarism and the politics of inflation’, in Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders (eds.), Making Thatcher’s Britain 
(Cambridge, 2012), 62-77, at 68. 
15 The literature is vast, but for this period Addison, The Road to 1945 makes the case for consensus, while 
Jefferys, The Churchill Coalition and Wartime Politics argues against. See also Arthur Marwick, ‘Middle 
opinion in the thirties: planning, progress and political “agreement”’, English Historical Review (1964), 285-98. 
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considers. Richard Toye has suggested that, rather than pondering how far political parties 
‘fundamentally agreed’, it is more profitable to ask ‘what … politicians [were] trying to 
achieve’ through the language of agreement.16 Naturally enough, this style served a useful 
purpose in the coalition. Policies were needed to counteract inflation and social unrest. 
Meanwhile Brian Harrison has also highlighted the tactical and calculative dimension to 
‘consensus’.17 Wood appears to be a useful wartime test case of Harrison’s approach: 
politicians ‘estimating where consensus can be most securely based’ and then guiding 
opinion towards it.18  
What emerges is a sharper sense of how the coalition was safeguarded in its crucial 
early stages. In integrating this within the literature, the article draws on a variety of archival 
sources. While Wood left no personal papers, an analysis can be developed from other 
materials. It makes particular use of Cabinet and Treasury records, as well as correspondence, 
diaries, newspapers, Mass Observation data and Home Intelligence reports. 
I 
Kingsley Wood was shaped by the political traditions of reforming liberal conservatism and 
coalition liberalism. These would be important influences on his style. In 1918 he had earned 
a knighthood for organising a petition calling upon the government to establish a Ministry of 
Health, before entering national politics as a Conservative MP.19 After serving as 
Parliamentary Private Secretary to two coalition Liberal Ministers of Health in the Lloyd 
George government, Christopher Addison (1919-21) and Alfred Mond (1921-22), he worked 
under Neville Chamberlain as Parliamentary Secretary at Health from 1924-29. Wood held 
                                                            
16 Richard Toye, ‘From ‘consensus’ to ‘common ground’: the rhetoric of the postwar settlement and its 
collapse’, Journal of Contemporary History (2013), 3-23, at 6. 
17 Brian Harrison, ‘The rise, fall and rise of political consensus in Britain since 1940’, History (1999), 301-24. 
18 Harrison, ‘The rise, fall and rise…’, pp. 301-2. 
19 The brief sketch that follows draws on Wood’s obituary in The Times, 22 September 1943, as well as Peden, 
DNB. 
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numerous posts in the National Government, being Secretary of State for Health between 
1935-38 and Secretary of State for Air from 1938-40. In these roles he developed a reputation 
for innovation, enthusiasm for working across party boundaries, and actively seeking out the 
guidance of specialists. He was consistently sensitive to presentational issues. For instance, at 
the Air Ministry Wood displayed surefootedness in responding to public anxiety when 
dealing with the profits stemming from air force production. This was a first-class 
presentational problem, and in March 1939 he managed to cajole the industry to forego a 
third of its annual profits. 
Representative of the new brand of interwar Conservatism and a friend of 
Chamberlain,20 Wood’s standing was underlined when he was elected grand master of the 
Primrose League as Stanley Baldwin’s successor. But on the morning of 9 May 1940, he met 
with Churchill and seemingly planted a seed in his mind by advising him to ‘say nothing’ if 
asked to serve under Lord Halifax,21 before telling Chamberlain in front of the Cabinet that 
he would have to resign.22 Wood was an ‘extremely barometical politician’, as one 
contemporary had it.23 He denied betraying Chamberlain, though somewhat 
unconvincingly.24 Addison concluded that the Treasury was a ‘reward’ and described his 
alignment with Churchill as the ‘new firm’ in the party.25 Wood later advised the prime 
minister not to antagonise the Conservatives with any ‘Munich victimisation[s]’.26 
                                                            
20 John Colville, The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries, 1939-1955 (London, 1985), 11 May 1940, p. 
124. 
21 The Earl of Avon, The Reckoning (London, 1965), 96-7. 
22 Many historians have noted that Wood’s important walk-on part in the fall of Chamberlain. See John 
Charmley, Churchill and the End of Glory: A Political Biography (London, 1995 edn.), 394; Sheila Lawlor, 
Churchill and the Politics of War, 1940-1941 (Cambridge, 1994), 100; Graham Stewart, Burying Caesar: 
Churchill, Chamberlain, and the Battle for the Tory Party (London, 1999), 418-9. 
23 Colin Coote, Editorial (London, 1965), 203-4. 
24 House of Lords, Lord Beaverbrook papers, BBK/D 489, ‘Kingsley Wood. Question and Answer’ (n.d.). 
25 Addison, The Road to 1945, 102. 
26 Churchill College, Cambridge, Winston S. Churchill papers, CHAR 20/2025-27, Wood to Churchill, 27 July 
1941. 
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The rest of the article will delineate the new Chancellor’s efforts to devise financial 
policies which were effective in meeting the challenge of total war while being politically 
palatable across the party spectrum. Achieving both was a sine qua non if the war effort and 
coalition were to be sustainable. This necessitated a gradual process of persuasion, intra-
coalition bargaining and an emphasis on political symbolism. 
Treasury matters awaiting the government’s immediate attention were potential 
sources of destabilisation. Grappling with them compelled Wood to build bridges with the 
Conservatives’ new coalition partners. For instance the issue of profiting from the war had 
proven to be a highly combustible public problem a generation earlier, during the Great War. 
In his first major decision after entering the Treasury, Wood moved quickly to address the 
question. In late May 1940, he sought to neutralise it altogether by levying an Excess Profits 
Tax (EPT) at a rate of 100%. Under this scheme, businesses operated on a ‘cost plus’ basis; 
profits above a certain level (and this varied) were to be taken by the state.27 This tax would 
be applied universally across the economy. Politically, it was a sensible decision. And it was 
his decision: in a paper brought before the War Cabinet in late May, the Chancellor rejected a 
counter-proposal that export industries might pay only 60% EPT, asserting bluntly that such 
an idea ‘could not be entertained’.28 
It is difficult to judge how far the policy was specifically designed with Labour 
sentiment in mind, but in his official history Sayers suggested that it was probably ‘political’ 
in motivation.29 As will be seen below, while policy was usually articulated as being targeted 
at ‘public opinion’, for Wood’s purposes ‘public opinion’ frequently amounted to the 
sensitivities of Labour; and in fact his measures were often better received among the latter 
than the former. In an accompanying memorandum to colleagues, Wood wrote that ‘I ask as a 
                                                            
27 CAB 65, WM (40), 145, 29 May 1940. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Sayers, Financial Policy, 46. 
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matter of grave urgency for the concurrence of the War Cabinet in the proposal that the EPT 
should be raised to 100% in its application to all undertakings’.30 He justified the decision by 
invoking the spirit of legitimacy: ‘in the very grave times through which we are passing’, 
such a policy was sure to ‘accord with public feeling’ about profits.31 The paper 
acknowledged that while an EPT targeted only on industries undertaking war work was 
feasible, a universal 100% tax would command support and remove a likely source of 
friction.32 The Chancellor’s justification, in so strongly emphasising legitimacy, was 
implicitly political. At the least, the approach was a way of bringing together financial 
necessity and appropriate political presentation. A blanket policy was needed to prevent 
profits from becoming a running problem. Churchill proved unhappy about the EPT, 
complaining in 1941 that it was ‘harping to insatiable left-wing propaganda’;33 yet Wood 
arguably showed himself more alive to the nuances of coalition than the prime minister. 
Measures such as this were a test of coalition bona fides. And it did appeal to Labour, Herbert 
Morrison seconding the proposal in Cabinet.34 Outside the government, Labour’s F.W. 
Pethick-Lawrence – one of the parliamentary party’s two ‘acting leaders’ – welcomed it from 
the dispatch box in the Commons.35 It was agreed that the new, universal, EPT should be 
implemented.36 Invoking a ‘greater incentive than profit’, Wood appealed in Parliament to the 
‘will to victory’.37 
The EPT was an illustration of the Chancellor’s recognition of the need to present 
policy so as to build cross-party agreement. In acknowledging the implications of a blanket 
                                                            
30 CAB 66, WP (40), 176, ‘Excess Profits Tax: Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer’, 28 May 
1940 (emphasis added). 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Martin Daunton, Just Taxes: The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1914-1979 (Cambridge, 2002), 184. 
34 CAB 66, WP (40), 176, ‘Excess Profits Tax: Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer’, 28 May 
1940. 
35 H.C. Debs., 5 June 1940, col. 951. 
36 CAB 66, WP (40), 176, ‘Excess Profits Tax: Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer’, 28 May 
1940. 
37 H.C. Debs., 5 June 1940, col. 949. 
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policy on profits, and – crucially – explaining himself to colleagues in terms of political 
integration and stabilisation, Wood thus helped to set the tone for the new coalition. At a 
moment of wider and accelerating social upheaval, the appearance of ‘fairness’ and being 
seen to ‘do the right thing’ was vital.38 Moreover this was a contingent process dependent on 
sensible decision-making; politicians had often been unable to achieve an air of legitimacy in 
the previous war.39 
The Chancellor was also able to cooperate successfully with Labour in the sensitive – 
and financially risky – realm of wages policy. In an intervention on 30 May, he initially 
rejected a proposal from the Minister of Labour, Ernest Bevin, that the government should 
increase wages for agricultural workers in order to boost food production. He objected that 
such a proposal would introduce ‘violent change’ and risk ‘serious’ damage to the economy 
by being ‘acutely inflationary’.40 The concern was that if wages were increased in one sector, 
trade unions could be expected to press new wage claims elsewhere, resulting in rising 
inflation. Wood made clear his displeasure that the proposal was leaked to the Daily Express 
– an obvious attempt to force his hand and ‘greatly embarrass[ing]’ to the government.41 Yet 
it is perhaps telling that Wood withdrew his objection to the wage rise as soon as Bevin 
pledged that the unions would not seek to exploit a favourable settlement.42 At the same 
meeting, the Chancellor similarly agreed to improve the wages of railway workers by 3s per 
week after Bevin offered further reassurances that it did not amount to a slippery slope. 
(Bevin revealed that he had told the Trade Union Congress to suspend new wage claims.) 
This was another early but important contribution to the process of demonstrating inter-party 
good will. 
                                                            
38 Mary Evans and David Morgan, The Battle for Britain: Citizenship and Ideology in the Second World War 
(London, 1993), 25-9. 
39 Consult John Turner, British Politics and the Great War: Coalition and Conflict 1915-1918 (London, 1992), 
for the political effects of this failure. 
40 CAB 65, WM (40), 149, 31 May 1940. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
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Throughout 1940 Wood sought to extract the sting from further sensitive issues. In 
October he devised a new policy under which the state would pay full compensation for war 
damage.43 This would be financed via a 3% charge on the value of all property, the state 
matching the funds raised. The timing of payment would vary according to priorities for 
materials, but if payment was deferred the government would pay interest and offer an 
advance of up to £500 to assist with new accommodation.44 This measure attracted 
widespread support across the parties. And in late November, Wood sought common ground 
on the matter of reconstruction planning. If there was one issue likely to divide the parties, 
this was it. The Chancellor endorsed Attlee’s suggestion that the Cabinet War Aims 
Committee should decide the ‘broad principles’ for reconstruction planning by which 
Whitehall would be guided.45 This body was comprised of senior ministers. Yet, importantly, 
Wood actually took Attlee’s idea further, proposing that the committee might also draw up a 
clear ‘hierarchy of priorities’ for transmission to government departments.46 Issues that might 
destabilise the coalition were to be kept in the hands of politicians. 
This approach did not simply entail making concessions to Labour. Wood was 
resistant where he felt it necessary. The Chancellor fought Bevin over increasing 
unemployment insurance in June,47 rejected a land tax,48 and in September had a 
confrontation with Attlee on family allowances payments to service personnel. The Labour 
leader wanted Wood’s proposed rise (from 27s to 30s for the average family) to be tripled, 
and threatened that his party would oppose this ‘inadequate’ policy in Parliament.49 However 
the Chancellor remained intransigent, arguing that ‘the state of the national finances would 
                                                            
43 CAB 67, WP (G) (40), ‘Compensation for War Damage to Property: Memorandum by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer’, 1 October 1940. 
44 Ibid. 
45 CAB 87/90, WA (40), 9, ‘Note on a War Aims Secretariat’, 26 November 1940. 
46 Ibid. 
47 CAB 65, WM (40), 180, 24 June 1940. 
48 H.C. Debs., 23 July 1940, col. 649. 
49 CAB 65, WM (40), 251, 17 September 1940. 
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not justify increases greater than [I] had proposed’.50 In October he mounted a defence of the 
profits of the railway industry, contending that companies were entitled to a ‘fair and modest 
reward’ for efficiency and thus should not be restricted to the pre-war average of profits of 
£40m per annum, as some had proposed, despite the otherwise 100% level of EPT.51 A harsh 
policy would remove incentives to cost-cutting in a critical area of infrastructure.52 
On the whole, however, these measures – particularly the EPT – had a stabilising 
effect on parliamentary politics. Westminster was not wracked by the recurrent tensions over 
profits that had characterised the First World War. But, importantly, it should be noted that 
their influence over wider public opinion was limited. Within days of initiating the EPT, at 
the Bow and Bromley by-election the Labour candidate, an alderman called C.W. Key, told a 
public meeting that ‘excess war profits are to be wholly taken over by the state. For the first 
time, public interest is supreme’.53 Yet months later, Mass Observation still reported a 
pervasive national suspicion among those who considered themselves ‘progressive’ that 
‘profits had not been reduced’.54 Discussing a motivational poster campaign bearing the 
slogan ‘Go To It!’, one worker was ‘nauseated’ that the government should ask this ‘when 
they’re making such huge profits’.55 Clearly, in the eyes of some, the state and employers 
remained hostile to workers. The Dunbartonshire by-election in February 1941 saw the 
expression of similar sentiments.56 
                                                            
50 Ibid. 
51 CAB 67, WP (G) (40), ‘Financial Arrangements for the Railways: Memorandum by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and the Secretary of State for Transport’, 21 October 1940. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Mass Observation archive (online), file report 205, ‘The Bow and Bromley by-election’, June 1940. 
54 Mass Observation, file report 1077, ‘Excess Profits Tax’, February 1942. 
55 Mass Observation, file report 306, ‘Testing the slogan “Go To It!”,  June 1940. 
56 Mass Observation, file report 593, ‘Dunbartonshire by-election’, February 1941. 
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 The fact that hostilities between socio-economic groups – especially workers and 
business – endured is now well-understood.57 Pre-war views remained entrenched.58 Class 
consciousness was strong.59 Yet Mass Observation found that reaction to the EPT was 
strongest from ‘industrial, commercial and business elements’.60 It was attacked ‘from the 
start’ as an ‘enormous’ task for companies to oversee given that it was a ‘maze’ of 
regulations.61 It was ‘a whole continent of pits and traps’. Both workers and business alike 
remained unhappy. Wood’s efforts to neutralise controversy over profits was largely a 
success at Westminster. But the evidence of strong, and diverse, public feeling on the issue 
underlines the limited capacity of politicians to reshape wider social and cultural attitudes 
during the war.  
Perhaps in recognition of the Chancellor’s growing political significance, in October 
1940 Churchill brought Wood into the inner War Cabinet. According to Lord Beaverbrook, 
Wood was one of the ‘Tory managers’ who vetoed Churchill’s intention to also bring 
Morrison inside the War Cabinet as it would ‘disturb the balance of the parties’.62 The 
Chancellor kept lines of communication open with Lloyd George.63 He later warned the 
prime minister that ‘the Socialists’ wanted ‘to see the position of prestige of the Treasury 
weakened as much as possible’.64 But in blending finance with a sensitivity to symbolism and 
‘legitimacy’, Wood’s approach resembled a tentative bid to map the new centre-ground 
created by cross-party alliance and the shock of war. 
                                                            
57 For new insights on wartime social history, see Geoffrey G. Field, Blood, Toil and Sweat: Remaking the 
British Working Class, 1939-1945 (Oxford, 2011). Consult also Sonya O. Rose, Which People’s War? National 
Identity and Citizenship in Wartime Britain (2004). 
58 For a contemporary perspective, see Tom Harrison, ‘A note on class consciousness and class 
unconsciousness’, Sociological Review (1942), 147-65. 
59 Field, Blood, Toil and Sweat, chapter three. 
60 Mass Observation, ‘Excess Profits Tax’. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Beaverbrook interview with W.P. Crozier, 24 August 1940, in A.J.P. Taylor (ed.), W.P. Crozier, Off The 
Record: Political Interviews, 1933-1943 (London, 1973), 196-9. 
63 House of Lords, Lloyd George papers, LG/G/19/22/1-8, Wood to Lloyd George, 22 July 1940. 
64 Churchill papers, CHAR 20/2025-27, Wood to Churchill, 27 July 1941. 
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II 
In his own words, Churchill’s policy was to spend every penny Britain could lay its hands on 
and ‘leave future financial problems on the lap of the Eternal Gods’.65 After moving to the 
Treasury, one of the Chancellor’s first significant decisions was thus to ensure that he 
received adequate expert advice. He established a ‘Consultative Council’ of outsiders, 
consisting of economists, bankers, industrialists and trade unionists that became the catalyst 
for major changes in financial policy. John Maynard Keynes was a member. The Council’s 
terms of reference were deliberately broad – ‘the special problems which confront the 
Treasury as a consequence of war conditions’ – because it was supposed to operate across all 
fronts, devising solutions to a range of challenges. And it is important to note that this was 
additional advice: Wood was not replacing existing, internal processes but ensuring that he 
was exposed to as much counsel as possible. He had pursued a similar approach at the Air 
Ministry and Post Office. 
The biggest challenge confronting the Treasury was to transfer resources to meet the 
cost of war without resorting to inflation. The deficit between government revenue and 
expenditure was soon labelled the ‘inflationary gap’. From the outset, Wood was clear that 
inflation was the principal problem to be countered; but he was equally clear that doing so 
was politically difficult. Whatever decision he took, whichever strategy he settled on, the 
Chancellor risked arousing controversy. As such the problem was not simply that of paying 
for the war, but doing so in a way that was politically and socially sustainable. The next two 
sections deal with not only the content of policy, but how it was communicated and explained 
to the political parties in Parliament and the wider public. We lack clear evidence about 
Wood’s private thought-process on this issue, but his strategy is discernible in the policies 
pursued over the next year. The Chancellor chose to move incrementally and build 
                                                            
65 Churchill, Their Finest Hour, 492. 
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agreement. That was why the coalition’s initial Budget, delivered in July 1940, was 
somewhat underwhelming. 
Presented to Parliament on 23 July, this was a revision of the April 1940 Budget of 
Sir John Simon. Simon had projected a deficit of £1.5 billion for 1940-41; his successor 
revised this to £2.2 billion.66 The logical means of bringing this under control was through 
new taxation. That would simultaneously boost Treasury revenue while reducing consumer 
spending-power. Consumer goods were already scarce in shops, and this threatened price 
inflation. If less money remained in people’s pockets as a result of higher taxes, and a 
purchase tax was levied on consumer goods, the risk of inflation would be reduced. Wood 
was convinced that ‘civilian consumption must be strictly controlled’ lest there be a chain-
reaction of inflation.67 
But a significant obstacle was the Labour party. The junior partner in the government 
opposed the plan for a purchase tax on consumer goods, arguing that it would 
disproportionately hit working-class living standards.68 Financial policy thus threatened to 
strike at the base of the coalition. Addressing this while achieving the desired goal was an 
obvious presentational challenge. After much haggling, the Chancellor opted to keep the 
purchase tax but mollified opposition by making it only one among several measures of stiff 
taxation. Standard income tax was raised from 7s. 6d. to 8s. 6d. A further 10% estate duty 
was levied on estates above £10,000. Surtax on the first slice of income above £2,000 was 
increased from 1s. 3d. to 2s., while the top rate of 9s. 6d. was reduced from those earning 
£30,000 to £20,00. The result was an increase in direct taxation of over £200m per annum.69 
This was the crucial political counterweight needed to win Labour’s support for increased 
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indirect taxation. In addition to the tax on consumer goods, the 1940 Budget boosted 
revenues through substantially increased duties on alcohol, tobacco, and entertainments.70 
In his Budget speech, the Chancellor was careful to present his measures to politicians 
and public alike as ‘a tax on personal expenditure’.71 The Budget contained exemptions for 
food, fuels, and children’s clothing. Luxury items – defined as purchases that could be 
postponed or avoided – would be taxed at 33.5% under the new purchase tax, and items that 
needed to be replaced – such as adult’s clothing and crockery – at 16%. It was estimated that 
these measures would yield another £110m per annum.72 The scale of the political challenge 
confronting Wood is apparent in that despite his cautious presentation, the purchase tax still 
met opposition in the Commons, especially from the Labour benches. ‘We have heard it said 
many times that we cannot soak the rich any more, but I always find that there is a class of 
society which lives very well indeed after all the soaking. The soaking does not seem to 
trouble them very much, and cannot ever have gone very deep’, declared John Tinker, a 
Labour MP.73 Another, Robert Richards, argued that ‘the poorer section of the community’ 
was contributing disproportionately: ‘the fact is that there is no equality of sacrifice’.74 
Though not generally representative of Labour opinion, the Communist William Gallacher 
blamed the crisis on ‘the capitalist system’ and denounced the squeeze on consumer goods as 
being sure to ‘starve’ the masses. ‘Before there is the slightest thought of cutting down the 
consumption goods of the masses of the people, every luxury hotel and wealthy house in the 
country should be closed down.75 
Sayers argued that in 1940 Parliament remained unwilling to face up to the costs of 
war, suggesting that while much rhetoric about ‘equal sacrifice’ was deployed in response to 
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the Budget, practical alternatives were conspicuous by their absence.76 The Chancellor’s 
approach blended the sensitivity required to achieve the crucial task of carrying the bulk of 
Labour MPs with the broader policy effects of raising tax revenue and restraining purchasing 
power – and thus tackling inflation. 
It is possible to see the 1940 Budget as something of a false start. Yet though it did 
not signify a bold leap in policymaking – that would come in 1941 – and was criticised in the 
press as ‘timid’, ‘shirking the issue’, and not a ‘serious attempt to grapple with the financial 
difficulties of the war’,77 it is important to recognise that Wood was consciously engaged in a 
process of long-term political education within Parliament. Even before introducing the 
Budget, for instance, the Chancellor indicated that policy and legitimacy went hand-in-hand, 
stating that while ‘I have no doubt that it will be necessary to increase [taxation] further in the 
near future … I think it is essential to afford some short period … during which the country 
can adjust itself to the considerable burdens already placed upon it’.78 Keynes and other 
advisers were pressing for a more decisive shift but Wood judged that, in the context of 
coalition, a bolder policy was sustainable only if it commanded support.79 To that end ‘a little 
time, however short … is valuable’.80 In the Budget speech itself he reiterated that ‘it is plain 
that we cannot expect’ to raise all the necessary revenue ‘in one Budget’, and thus ‘we must 
regard this Budget … as an interim Budget’.81 These public statements are important pieces 
of evidence and shed light on the thinking behind the policy, as well as the recognised 
importance of presentation. They indicate that in Wood’s view the 1940 Budget effectively 
had to be inadequate because the political support for a bolder measure simply did not yet 
exist. Moreover, the justification offered – ‘time’ – was, again, one of political stabilisation. 
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The atmospherics of the Budget appear to have been largely determined by the mood 
at Westminster. For Wood ‘public opinion’ seems to have often consisted of the Labour party 
in Parliament. Yet considering the Budget’s wider public reception is also illustrative. Home 
Intelligence reported a mixed reaction. For some, there was an outlook of ‘cheerful 
resignation’, while the deduction of income tax at source was ‘popular’.82 The Chancellor’s 
targeting of the purchase tax at luxuries ‘gave satisfaction to the artisan population’.83 But 
others were more negative. The increased taxation of even small incomes ‘causes anxiety’.84 
The inclusion of books in the purchase tax was ‘condemned’.85 Some were critical of a 
‘compromise Budget’.86 Here – as with the EPT – the capacity of politicians to lead public 
opinion in one direction was limited. Reaction to policy remained diverse. Moreover Wood 
himself was never a prominent public figure; even in 1942, Mass Observation found that only 
‘one man in two and one woman in four knew who the Chancellor was’.87  Political 
communication was, perhaps, easier to manage at Westminster. 
The evidence indicates that, whatever the limitations of the Budget, Wood conceived 
of his role as being a consensus-builder in parliamentary politics. He acknowledged the 
continuing threat of inflation (‘I do not hesitate to say that this is a fundamentally dangerous 
situation’),88 but, as Harrison postulated of ‘consensus’, one important component was 
politicians’ slowly guiding opinion towards it.89 Wood was particularly careful to run 
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proposals past Bevin.90 Toye has demonstrated how, prior to May 1940, Keynes found that 
the difficulty in persuading Labour of his ideas had at least as much to do with political 
presentation as economic policy.91 The same was true after the formation of the coalition.  
III 
It seems clear that these measures played a role in the early stability of the new 
government in a way that has not previously been explored. But it would be some time before 
the Chancellor felt able to shift policy. Wood spent months – from the autumn of 1940 
onwards – planning the 1941 Budget. He challenged Treasury advisers to come up with ideas 
and gradually synthesised them into a strategy.92 The resultant policy, expressed in the 1941 
Budget and an accompanying White Paper, reinforced the coalition and helped to ensure that 
the equal distribution of misery did not become a disruptive public issue. 
In the autumn of 1940 Keynes produced four ‘Notes on the Budget’ for Wood.93 His 
intellectual rationale was that the ‘inflationary gap’ must be closed through a definitive 
Budget. Keynes wanted the state to conceptualise the national economy in a new way, 
grappling with demand and balance in the whole economy in order to make the country run at 
peak efficiency. He also advocated that the Treasury should secure working-class assent for 
higher taxes by underwriting the cost of living.94 Both of these proposals were radical courses 
of action. The first would constitute a shift in the role of the state. The second would commit 
the government to an unknown and unlimited liability until normal economic conditions 
resumed. 
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The Chancellor had already been left furious at an effort by Labour’s Arthur 
Greenwood to develop a dual economic policy.95 On 21 October Wood held a meeting with 
Keynes, Lord Catto, Sir Horace Wilson, Sir Richard Hopkins, and Sir Frederick Phillips to 
discuss strategy.96 After considering Keynes’s philosophy, he instructed the Treasury to 
launch a study of the four competing ideas for the Budget: the schemes of Keynes (financed 
by a surcharge on top of the existing income tax and surtax), Catto (a flat-rate surcharge on 
all incomes), Josiah Stamp (a new excess earnings tax, modelled on the EPT), and the Inland 
Revenue (straightforward increases in direct taxes). Wood also requested an assessment of 
Keynes’s suggestion that ‘as part and parcel of a severe Budget I should agree to stabilise the 
Cost of Living Index’.97  
Significantly, he explicitly ordered that the ‘psychological’ implications of each 
scheme be weighed in detail alongside the ‘financial’.98 A report commissioned by Wood 
stressed that ‘wartime economic policy has got to work not only in economic terms, but in 
what may broadly be called political [or] sociological terms’.99 These are telling phrases. 
They underline the Chancellor’s awareness of the importance of perception and the ‘selling’ 
of strategy. It is unclear whether he was primarily concerned here with the ‘psychology’ of 
Labour, the wider public, or both. But in seeking to devise a financial policy that would 
endure for the remainder of the war, the imperatives of coalition politics remained ever-
present. Wood’s sensitivity to the maintenance of broad support for higher taxes on the public 
is apparent in that while still pondering the details of the policy, he began building a political 
consensus for it. One component of the 1941 Budget was a revision of the EPT to enable 
businesses to plan for the future with greater confidence. This perhaps indicates a degree of 
                                                            
95 Colville, The Fringes of Power, 19 October 1940. Also CAB 71/2, LP (41), 11, 28 March 1941. 
96 T171/355, ‘The Next Budget’, 21 October 1940. 
97 T171/355, Wood to Wilson, ‘The Next Budget’, 14 January 1941. 
98 T171/355, ‘The Next Budget’, 21 October 1940. 
99 T171/355, ‘Public Opinion and Paying for the War’, (n.d., but January 1941) (emphasis added). 
21 
 
responsiveness to the vocal complaints about the tax emanating from the private sector. But 
wider suspicion towards profits remained, the Manchester Guardian calling for a 
‘revolutionary change of outlook’ to shift away from the ‘profit motive’.100 Aware of the 
disruptive potential of this at a time when taxes on the general population were to be 
increased, the Chancellor circulated a Cabinet memorandum on the topic in January 1941. 
This was much earlier than his other Budget proposals. The paper stressed that the 100% rate 
of EPT left companies without sufficient funds to invest in their own future.101 There was 
concern that it would have a debilitating effect in reducing enthusiasm for innovation. He 
outlined two solutions: either to reduce the EPT from 100%, or to add various ‘amendments’ 
to its management.102 
The War Cabinet agreed – as the Chancellor probably expected – that there would 
arise ‘great difficulty’ in any deviation from the symbolic 100% rate that he himself had 
implemented.103 Therefore Wood suggested that ‘in practice the best plan’ might be for some 
proportion of the total – he proposed a fifth – to be treated as a ‘loan’ and repaid to 
companies after the war, subject to being used on reconstruction rather than dividend 
payments.104 This was more palatable than the alternative of a cut in EPT. Labour ministers 
backed the idea, and the War Cabinet gave its approval.105 It was a further illustration of 
Wood’s sensitivity to issues of presentation. He had achieved his goals – and given 
reassurance to Conservative pro-business sentiment – while carrying the Labour party with 
him. Yet though the Chancellor offered assistance to businesses, he did not reverse his policy 
of strengthening the hand of the state. When the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, the 
Conservative Harry Crookshank, hyperbolically compared Wood’s methods to those of the 
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Fuhrer, he met with the response that ‘As for Hitler, I am not aware that he has done anything 
as yet which could be regarded as comparable to my proposals!’106 
After much preparation, Wood was now willing to make the change demanded by ‘the 
costliest war in history’.107 On 1 February 1941, he took a final decision on financial 
strategy.108 The Chancellor had already informed the War Cabinet that he intended the 
Budget to be ‘definitive’ and would not repeatedly revise taxes or continually add new 
ones.109 He resolved to utilise Keynes’s conviction that the Budget should become a 
comprehensive survey of the whole economy. It was through this that Wood left a lasting 
mark on the British state. In essence, his strategy was to employ cost of living subsidies (on 
food and essentials like fuel) from the Treasury to restrain increases in the price of goods. 
Bevin had been pressing for this since early 1939.110 It was hoped that this protection of 
living standards would leave the public willing to accept taxation being rendered as stiff as 
possible in order to swallow up all excess purchasing power in the economy. It was an 
experimental policy, but there was widespread concern that inflation was getting out of 
control.111 Keynes drafted the White Paper which was published alongside the Budget, 
making explicit the state’s conversion to basing financial policy on total national income.112 
In representing the first formal endorsement of Keynesian ideas, W.H. Greenleaf was right to 
label this an ‘historic’ moment.113 
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Henceforth the Treasury would manage not only the government sector, but assume a 
wider concern with demand and balance in the economy as a whole. Moreover the Chancellor 
cooperated with Bevin here: the state was to protect living standards, and in return Bevin 
used his influence with the unions to encourage restraint in pressing wage claims. Bevin had 
already assented to Wood’s request, made at the Lord President’s Committee, for assurances 
that the Minister of Labour would ‘join with him’ in resisting wage increases.114 Keynes 
advised Wood to put union leaders ‘on their honour’.115 The Times labelled this ‘extremely 
bold’.116 Concerned that living standards and industrial peace were being endangered by 
inflation, the Treasury targeted inflation of both cost and demand in order to achieve stability. 
The aim was to create conditions ‘which will enable the wages situation to be held about 
where it is now’.117 
Though the inspiration came from Keynes, Wood harnessed the economist rather than 
allow him to dictate policy. For instance, while the principles sketched out in Keynes’s 1939 
articles in The Times on ‘How to Pay for the War’ – estimating total national income, and 
identifying the gap between revenue and expenditure that would need to be plugged – had 
been accepted, Robert Skidelsky emphasises that the Budget was far from a carbon copy of 
Keynes’s ideas.118 In shaping the final policy Wood had in fact chosen to combine the 
funding plans of Keynes and the Inland Revenue. He dropped Keynes’s surcharge as 
‘impracticable’ and settled on the idea that revenue would have to be raised through income 
tax, while imposing on the Inland Revenue Keynes’s plan that half of the increased income 
tax would become a ‘withholding tax’ repayable to all taxpayers after the war.119 
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Essentially, it amounted to forced saving – and could thus be presented to the public 
in a more positive light than confiscatory taxation. The Chancellor drew on Keynes’s ideas, 
but ultimately he took the decisions: he balked at the economist’s proposal for the immediate 
introduction of universal family allowances, while the ‘withheld’ component of income tax 
was much smaller than Keynes desired. Keynes proposed that the ‘withheld’ component of 
income tax should amount to 15% of domestic spending; Wood made it just 3%. This might 
have been because of a fear of runaway post-war inflation by injecting a huge volume of 
purchasing power into the economy, or, alternatively, because Labour would discern it as 
enabling the rich to live off their capital. Either way, Skidelsky concluded that in pursuing 
legitimacy through high taxation of the wealthy, subsidising the cost of living, and universal 
rationing the Budget was actually more ‘socialist’ than ‘Keynesian’.120 But if we set aside 
economic theory, it is apparent that Wood had crafted a new approach to the economy that, in 
the end, proved tolerable to most significant shades of political opinion. This was a difficult 
achievement, as the Great War had demonstrated. Keynes himself respected Wood’s skill in 
the political presentation and packaging of economic ideas. Upon hearing of the Chancellor’s 
death in 1943, Keynes remarked that ‘he had the gift of converting [any economic idea] into a 
platitude intelligible to the merest child. This is a great political gift, not to be despised’.121 
When the Chancellor presented the proposals to the War Cabinet, he projected an 
estimated government expenditure of £3.7bn compared to total revenue of £3.2bn. This left a 
shortfall of £500m to be found. Wood believed the lack of consumer goods on the shelves 
would lead to a rise in personal savings of £2-300m. He therefore sought £250m in new 
taxation. It was decided to increase income tax from 8s. 6d. to 10s: this would bring 3m new 
taxpayers into income tax, and yield £255m per annum. 
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Characteristically, Churchill was privately sceptical and interpreted the Budget 
proposals as a further sop to ‘other elements in public opinion’, by which he plainly meant 
Labour.122 That Churchill remained suspicious was implicit in the working title of a Treasury 
memorandum to be sent to his office: ‘Budget Policy Peptonised and Predigested for the 
PM’.123 For his part, Crookshank implored Wood to ‘just change your mind!’124 But this 
overlooked the scale of the problem, and the need to meet several challenges simultaneously. 
The revenue yield would be enough to close the inflationary gap, and given that the 
Chancellor was making concessions on the EPT, planned to resist increases in inheritance 
tax, and emphasised that forced saving was strictly a temporary expedient, to interpret the 
1941 Budget as a shift towards ‘socialism’ is to miss the point. The reality was more 
complex, and reflective of Wood’s approach. In balancing doctrinal concerns, it had 
something – enough – for all. 
Ultimately, the government accepted the Budget. As many scholars have noted, this 
established the core principles which would shape financial policy until the end of the war. 
The Budget speech itself, delivered on 7 April, perhaps represented the peak of Wood’s 
career.125 Earlier drafts, written from March 1941 onwards, had debated how to publicly sell 
what the Chancellor described as the ‘necessity of stabilisation’.126 He eventually settled on 
repeatedly stressing ‘fairness’, and in that respect the speech indicated the continued primacy 
of legitimacy in his calculations. 
At the outset the Chancellor summarised the objective as being ‘… to ensure that we 
continue to maintain our national finances on sound lines and that we are able, when the time 
comes, to pursue post-war measures of reconstruction and social advance which we all desire 
                                                            
122 PREM 5/18/7, Churchill to Wood, 19 February 1941. 
123 T171/356, ‘Budget Policy Peptonised and Predigested for the PM’, 25 February 1941. 
124 T171/356, Crookshank to Wood, 23 March 1941. 
125 H.C. Debs., 7 April 1941, cols., 1297-1332. 
126 T171/356, Wood memorandum, ‘Suggested lines of Budget speech’, 10 March 1941. 
26 
 
to see achieved’. Wood went on to emphasise taking ‘the profits out of war’ and banishing 
‘war fortunes’, something which had been done ‘with the approval of every section of the 
community’.127 And he offered an account of his approach to inflation: 
The danger which we have to control … is that of being flooded out by an excess of purchasing power. … To 
avert that menace, it is vital for us to possess a stout and well-constructed dam. That is the object of our systems 
of food and industrial controls, of our systems of price control, rationing and the like. But we also have to abate 
the force of the torrent. That is the function of finance. The solution would be impossible unless [the torrent] 
was eased by the withholding of a substantial part of the surplus purchasing power through the instrument of 
taxation.128 
The speech warned of ‘the evil effects, the indiscriminate injustices and the 
catastrophic burdens imposed by unchecked inflation’. And, once again, ‘fairness’ was its 
primary linguistic instrument: the Chancellor wanted to ‘to distribute with all possible justice 
the weight of the resulting burden’.129 As Sabine observed, that this explanation was accepted 
in the Commons was apparent from the fact that the subsequent debate transcended the ‘once 
rigid demarcation of … Budget[s] … on party lines’, in contrast to 1940.130 
Importantly, the Budget was well-received in the press, The Times declaring that 
Wood had taken ‘the longest and most drastic view’, to ‘practically universal welcome’.131 
‘Nothing … more drastic could be imagined’.132 The Budget speech represented ‘a lesson on 
the nature of money and the function of government finance’.133 Moreover newspapers at 
opposite ends of the political spectrum welcomed it.134 The Daily Mirror thought it ‘balanced 
and fair’. The Times observed that, through cost of living subsidies, the Budget cleverly 
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imposed a ‘great moral obligation’ on the Labour movement to moderate wage demands: it 
simultaneously wooed Labour while making living standards dependent on restraint.135 
But, as before, not all audiences were impressed. The Budget ‘dashed many hopes’ 
among businesses, with the post-war 20% refund on EPT judged to be ‘pie in the sky’.136 One 
Mass Observation diarist, a school teacher, remarked later in the year that ‘I wonder where 
Sir Kingsley does his shopping’ when discussing inflation.137 And, despite the effort to 
encourage saving, in 1942 Mass Observation found that ‘about a third’ of working class 
populations admitted they could still ‘save more than they did’.138 On the whole, however, 
the Budget did succeed in its aim of preventing serious instability or recrimination. Home 
Intelligence found that ‘the Budget was well-received’, and ‘the principle of compulsory 
saving is popular’. ‘There is considerable relief that there are no new taxes on beer and 
tobacco’. Meanwhile ‘the middle-classes are glad that direct taxation is at last to affect the 
labouring classes … little comment is reported from the working-classes themselves’.139 
Within several months, even protest from businesses against taxation had ‘almost 
disappeared’.140 
Historians have always recognised the importance of the 1941 Budget. This article, 
however, has explored the year-long political process of which the Budget was the 
culmination. If the destination of the paper is familiar, the journey – especially the process of 
framing and selling policy – is perhaps less so. Judged from a political perspective the Budget 
was, in the context of total war, the embodiment of the centre-ground. The way in which it 
was articulated was politically unobjectionable. Wood had been careful to be seen as 
equitable in imposing hardship. Indeed, equity was no longer a political question from 1941. 
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The fact that during the Second World War the coalition was not wracked by rows about 
equal suffering was arguably a significant contribution to the process of integration. The 
Economist later called the appearance of equity ‘one of the great social triumphs of the 
war’.141 
IV 
If broadly ‘Keynesian’ financial strategies were one of the bases of the post-war 
settlement, then the political and linguistic process through which this was first established as 
a core part of the British state’s activity needs to be understood. As we have seen, that was a 
gradual task; Wood had proceeded in increments, not merely developing policy but actively 
persuading audiences in Parliament of its utility. In doing so, he relied on the language of 
fairness. While ‘fairness’ might seen a somewhat banal (and contestable) idea, nonetheless it 
was a ubiquitous rhetoric in which ministers focused on the domestic arena articulated their 
actions and policy choices. Between the summer of 1940 and the spring of 1941, the 
Chancellor wrestled with the question of how to articulate and explain complex economic 
and political problems, and justify solutions. It had proven incumbent on Wood, perhaps 
more consistently than any other politician, to deal with the strains inherent in a radically 
reordered political space. While Keynes later bemoaned the primacy of ‘political 
considerations’ and ‘concessions to sentiment’, in practice those considerations could not be 
ignored.142 
Reaction to these policies – especially the EPT and the first two Budgets – among the 
public was inevitably diverse. Long-standing social tensions remained strong. If Mass 
Observation and Home Intelligence data is any indication, it is apparent that Wood’s political 
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signalling was more effective at Westminster than it proved in the wider country. On the 
other hand, Addison and Jeremy Crang have shown that grumbling, about all manner of 
issues, was widespread.143 It was part of everyday life in a country at war and afraid for its 
future. And the 1941 Budget, at least, can be judged a success in entrenching an approach 
that, while still the subject of some public unhappiness, was broadly acceptable. 
Following the 1941 Budget, finance was no longer a major political question and 
Churchill later dropped the Chancellor from the War Cabinet.144 Wood’s obituaries in 1943 
(he died on the day that he was due to announce a significant measure of tax modernisation, 
the creation of Pay-As-You-Earn),145 were marked by comments on his political shrewdness. 
In a piece entitled ‘Taxing without Tears’, The Times emphasised his ‘thorough 
understanding of current political values’ and ‘precise place’ in ‘the balance of the 
government’.146 Later, when Churchill complained of his own weak grasp of Conservative 
opinion, he observed ‘that is why I miss Kingsley Wood so much’.147 One Conservative MP, 
Sir Edward Campbell, remarked that ‘he would have made a successful Test Match 
captain’.148 The Chancellor’s role indicates that Conservatives were perhaps a greater creative 
force during the war than has sometimes been realised. The same might be suggested of Sir 
John Anderson (in practice a Conservative despite his ostensibly ‘National’ affiliation): 
probably the most powerful man in Whitehall at this time, but who has still not been properly 
integrated within literature on the period. As noted above, Oliver Lyttelton was a central 
figure in developing the apparatus of controls. Throughout the first year of coalition, Wood’s 
goal seems to have been to restore equilibrium to a political system that was seriously 
unbalanced. He had overseen the construction of a series of sophisticated and effective 
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financial policies, especially the 1941 Budget. The Economist interpreted that as being one of 
the ‘social triumphs’ of the war. But it was perhaps a considerable political success, too. 
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